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Abstract
It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by
considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that
players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with minimization of strat-
egy complexity, Rubinstein and co-authors studied forms of Nash equilibrium where strate-
gies are maximally simplified in that no strategy can be further simplified without sacrificing
payoff. Inspired by this line of work, we introduce a notion of equilibrium whereby strate-
gies are also maximally simplified, but with respect to a simplification procedure that is
more careful in that a player will not simplify if the simplification incents other players to
deviate. We study such equilibria in two-player machine games in which players choose
finite automata that succinctly represent strategies for repeated games; in this context, we
present techniques for establishing that an outcome is at equilibrium and present results on
the structure of equilibria.
1 Introduction
A frequently raised criticism of game theory is that its predictions clash with empirical observations as
a consequence of being based on the assumption that agents possess and use unbounded computational
power. This criticism has motivated the introduction and investigation of so-called models of bounded
rationality [28], in which computational power considerations on agents are present. A number of different
approaches to the study of bounded rationality have been suggested [2, 7, 17, 24, 26, 27]. One model that
has received considerable attention is a machine game in which players choose finite-state automata that
succinctly represent strategies for repeated games [18, 21, 24, 26, 1]; the model of finite-state automata
can be taken as a formalization of players having bounded-size memory, and is well-studied in computer
science.
Rubinstein with co-authors Abreu and Piccione [26, 1, 25], in the context of the machine game, proposed
and studied forms of Nash equilibrium under which strategies are maximally simplified in the sense that a
player’s strategy cannot be simplified without reducing his payoff. A supposition basic to this work is that
players desire to minimize the complexity of their strategies, and hence in choosing strategies are concerned
with balancing the maximization of payoff with the minimization of strategy complexity. Simplicity of
strategies may be valued for a number of reasons; for instance, complex strategies may be more expensive to
execute, more likely to break down, harder to learn, or costly to maintain [22]. Following Rubinstein [26],
it can be suggested that such maximally simplified equilibria resemble phenomena observed in real life:
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institutions, organizations, and human abilities may degenerate or be reduced if they contain unnecessary or
redundant components.
The Rubinstein-Abreu-Piccione line of work, more specifically, studies Nash equilibria where the play-
ers have preference relations that increase in the payoff and, when payoff is maintained, decrease in the
complexity. While one can study the equilibria they define in any game where there is a complexity measure
associated with the actions of each player, their work focuses on the mentioned machine game, and the
complexity measure studied is the number of states of an automaton, which can be viewed as the memory
size of a strategy.
Inspired by this line of work, we introduce and study a new notion of equilibrium intended to capture
maximally simplified strategies, but with respect to a more careful, conservative simplification procedure.
The motivation for this new equilibrium notion stems from the observations that, in the Rubinstein model, a
player simplifies without considering whether or not the simplification may incent other players to deviate,
and that this liberal mode of simplification may spoil desirable outcomes that are Nash equilibria in the
usual payoff sense. These observations can be illustrated by the following example. Consider the so-called
grim trigger strategy in the infinitely repeated Prisoner’s dilemma; this strategy, which can be implemented
by a two-state automaton, is to cooperate until the other player is seen to have defected, and to then defect
indefinitely. While this strategy paired with itself is a Nash equilibrium in the payoff sense–no player
can unilaterally deviate and increase his payoff–it is not an equilibrium in the Rubinstein sense, since either
player could maintain payoff but reduce complexity by switching to a strategy that always cooperates (which
is a strategy that can be implemented by a one-state automaton). Notice, however, that such a switch would
in turn incent the other player to change to a strategy that always defects against cooperation, thus spoiling
the cooperation. It can in fact be verified that no pair of strategies that cooperate indefinitely form an
equilibrium in the Rubinstein sense.
Whereas in the Rubinstein model a player will simplify his strategy so long as he can maintain his
payoff, in our model each player is forward-looking, and will only simplify his strategy if, in addition,
no other player can profitably deviate post-simplification. That is, in considering simplifications, players
are averse to potential payoff-motivated deviations by other players. Our notion of equilibrium, which we
call lean equilibrium, is thus defined as an outcome of strategies at Nash equilibrium such that no player
can both individually simplify his strategy and preserve the property of being at Nash equilibrium. The
described grim trigger strategy paired with itself does constitute a lean equilibrium in the infinitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemma: the described strategy has two states, so any simplification must have one state; in order
for the result to be a Nash equilibrium, the player with one state must always cooperate in order to be a best
response to the other player; but, this is not a Nash equilibrium as the other player could then profitably
deviate by always defecting.
We present results on lean equilibria for two-player machine games where each player chooses a finite-
state automaton representing a strategy in an infinitely repated game. We study three complexity measures;
in addition to studying the “number of states” measure, we study two measures that we introduce. One is
based on the number of states, but does not count threat states, and the other counts the number of transitions
to non-threat states; the precise definitions appear later in the paper. Our primary technical results are the
following.
• We give techniques for establishing that outcomes are at lean equilibrium, and illustrate their use by a
number of examples (Section 5).
• We present results on the structure of machines that are at equilibria, and, with respect to the number-
of-transitions measure, give a precise description of the equilibria structure. This description in fact
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shows that the machine structure can be inferred from a third-party observer that only views the
induced sequence of action pairs (Section 6).
We believe that the developed theory evidences that the two introduced complexity measures are natural and
mathematically robust.
While the present work focuses on machine games with finite automata and was certainly inspired by
previous work on such games, we want to emphasize that the notion of lean equilibrium is defined in a very
general way (Section 3) and can be applied to any game in which there is a notion of complexity associated
with the players’ actions. Indeed, our view is that one of the most promising avenues for future work is to
analyze the lean equilibria in other types of games where such a notion of complexity is present or can be
naturally defined; in particular, it could be of interest to study games arising directly from real-life situations
and phenomena. We believe that the theory and results developed in this work vindicates the introduced
equilibrium notion as a tangible and robust mathematical concept of which one can hope to present analysis
in further games.
Related work. The present work is a contribution to the study of bounded rationality; surveys and general
references include [27, 17, 3]. The present article can in particular be taken as following a body of research
where players in games are represented using models of computation; here, we briefly describe some of this
research.
The study of machine games where players select automata representing strategies in repeated games
was initiated early in the study of bounded rationality. The already described work of Rubinstein, Abreu,
and Piccione studied Nash equilibria where players’ preferences take into account strategy complexity in
addition to repeated game payoff. The paper of Rubinstein [26] studied an equilibrium concept in the spirit
of subgame perfect equilibrium, obtaining structural results on such equilibria. Abreu and Rubinstein [1]
gave general structural results on equilibria and studied the payoff sets of certain 2-by-2 games; and, Pic-
cione and Rubinstein [25] studied equilibria in repeated extensive games. Banks and Sundaram [4] studied a
equilibrium notion similar to that considered in these papers, but focused on a “transitional” notion of strat-
egy complexity that accounts for the amount of opponent monitoring required, and can differentiate among
strategies with the same number of states. Kalai and Stanford [18] gave a characterization of the number-
of-states complexity measure for automata via an analog of the Myhill-Nerode theorem, and study subgame
perfect equilibria in infinitely repeated games from the viewpoint of this measure. A number of works
studied repeated games played by finite automata where bounds on the strategy complexity are imposed
exogenously, including the articles of Neyman [20], Ben-Porath [6], Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [24],
and Neyman [21]; one focus of study is the set of payoffs sustainable in equilibrium. Gilboa [13], Papadim-
itriou [23], and Ben-Porath [5] studied the computational complexity of problems involving the computation
of best response automata. Spiegler [29, 30] presented equilibrium notions motivated by the idea that players
may need to justify their strategies; he modeled players as finite-state automata.
Another line of work studies games where players must employ computable strategies. Some of the
initial work explored basic consequences of this modeling and invokes notions and ideas from computabil-
ity theory, including the contributions of Binmore [8, 9], Canning [10], and Anderlini [2]. Megiddo and
Wigderson [19] presented results on games played by Turing machines where the number of states is re-
stricted. Howard [16], Tennenholtz [31], and Fortnow [11] showed existence of equilibrium and folk the-
orem style results by making use of self-reference ideas. Gossner [14] studied repeated games played by
polynomial-time Turing machines, invoking cryptographic assumptions to obtain results on the equilibria
achievable under public communication.
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More recent work includes the following. A framework for games where the actions have associated
costs was proposed and studied by Ben-Sasson, Kalai, and Kalai [7]. Halpern and Pass [15] presented and
studied a machine game on Turing machines where utilities can be a function of machine complexities in
addition to the action profile; among other issues, they study existence of equilibria and notions of protocol
security. Fortnow and Santhanam [12] introduced and studied a machine game model where players’ actions
are probabilistic Turing machines that output actions in an underlying game; the payoff associated with a
machine is discounted by the computation time used to produce actions. Their results include connections
between the existence of Nash equilibria in the so-called factoring game and the computatoinal complexity
of factoring, and general sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review some basic notions to be used. Our notation and terminology are standard, and for
the most part follow typical conventions such as those described in the text by Osborne and Rubinstein [22].
A strategic game is a tuple (N, (Ai), (i)) consisting of a set N = {1, . . . , n} of players, a nonempty set
Ai of actions for each player i ∈ N , and a preference relation i defined on A = ×j∈NAj for each player
i ∈ N . For the most part, we will focus on two-player strategic games where the preference relations are
specified by payoff functions ui : Ai → R. Recall that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game (N, (Ai), (i
)) is a profile a∗ ∈ A of actions such that for all i ∈ N and for all ai ∈ Ai, it holds that (a∗−i, ai) i
(a∗−i, a
∗
i ).
For our purposes in this paper, a convex combination of vectors x1, . . . , xd ∈ Rm is a vector of the form
α1x1 + · · ·+ αdxd where the αn are rational coefficients with
∑d
n=1 αn = 1 and 0 ≤ αn ≤ 1 for each n.
We will make use of the following payoff notions. Let G = (N, (Ai), (ui)) be a strategic game. A
feasible payoff profile of G is a convex combination of the vectors {u(a) | a ∈ A}. We define player i’s
minmax payoff, denoted vi, to be the lowest payoff that the other players can force upon player i, that is,
vi = mina−i∈A−i maxai∈Ai ui(a−i, ai). A feasible payoff profile w ∈ Rn of G is called enforceable if
vi ≤ wi for all i ∈ N , and is called strictly enforceable if vi < wi for all i ∈ N . See Osborne and
Rubinstein [22, Section 8.5] for more information on these notions.
3 Lean equilibrium
We define a complexity order on a set of actions Ai to be a binary relation on Ai. We will consider games
where each player i ∈ N has a complexity order Ei associated to his set of actions Ai; the intended
interpretation is that bi Ei ai if player i considers the action bi to have the same complexity as or lower
complexity than action ai. In such games, for ai, bi ∈ Ai, we will write bi ⊳ ai to denote that bi E ai holds
and ai E bi does not hold. Also, for a, b ∈ A, we will write bE a to denote that for all i ∈ N , it holds that
bi Ei ai. We remark that in studying machine games, each complexity order that we consider arises from
associating machines with elements in a total order; however, for broadest applicability, the results in this
section (in particular, Proposition 3.2) are presented for more general settings.
Definition 3.1 Let G = (N, (Ai), (i)) be a strategic game with complexity orders (Ei). A profile a∗ ∈ A
of actions is a lean equilibrium of the game G if a∗ is a Nash equilibrium, but for all i ∈ N and for all
ai ∈ Ai, if ai ⊳ a∗i , then (a∗−i, ai) is not a Nash equilibrium. 
We now present a basic property of lean equilibrium, namely, the existence of lean equilibria under the
assumption of the existence of Nash equilibria and a mild assumption on the complexity orders.
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Proposition 3.2 Suppose that G = (N, (Ai), (i)) is a strategic game with complexity orders (Ei) that are
transitive and are well-founded in the sense that for all i ∈ N and for all ai ∈ Ai, there exists a bound on
the length of a chain c1 ⊳i · · · ⊳i ck ⊳i ai. Then for every Nash equilibrium a∗ of G, there exists a lean
equilibrium b ∈ A such that bE a∗.
Proof. For an action ai from an action set Ai, let C(ai) denote the maximum length k of a chain c1⊳i · · ·⊳i
ck ⊳i ai. For an action profile a ∈ A, define C(a) =
∑
i∈N C(ai). We prove the result by induction on
C(a∗).
For the base case, where C(a∗) = 0, the profile a∗ is a lean equilibrium, as for all i ∈ N and for all
ai ∈ Ai, it does not hold that ai⊳ia∗i . For the inductive case, suppose that C(a∗) > 0. If the profile a∗ is not
a lean equilibrium, then there exists i ∈ N and there exists ai ∈ Ai such that (a∗−i, ai) is a Nash equilibrium
and ai⊳ia∗i . We have that C(a∗−i, ai) < C(a∗); by applying the induction hypothesis to (a∗−i, ai), we obtain
a lean equilibrium b ∈ A such that b E (a∗−i, ai). We have (a∗−i, ai) E a∗ and thus by transitivity of E, it
holds that bE a∗. 
One of the equilibrium notions studied by Abreu and Rubinstein [1] is Nash equilibrium with respect to
the lexicographical ordering where payoff is prioritized over complexity: one profile a∗ is strictly preferred
by a player to another profile b∗ if a∗ gives the player a strictly higher payoff than b∗, or if a∗ gives the player
the same payoff as b∗ but the player has strictly lower complexity in a∗. We formalize this equilibrium notion
and show that each such equilibrium is a lean equilibrium, as follows.
Definition 3.3 Let G = (N, (Ai), (i)) be a strategic game with complexity orders (Ei). A profile a∗ ∈ A
of actions is an Abreu-Rubinstein equilibrium of the game G if for all i ∈ N and for all ai ∈ Ai, (1)
(a∗−i, ai) i (a
∗
−i, a
∗
i ) and (2) (a∗−i, a∗i ) i (a∗−i, ai) implies that ai ⊳i a∗i does not hold. 
Condition (1) implies that the profile a∗ is a Nash equilibrium, and condition (2) essentially says that
there is no deviation ai for player i that yields the same utility and is simpler than a∗i .
Proposition 3.4 Let G = (N, (Ai), (i)) be a strategic game with complexity orders (Ei). Every Abreu-
Rubinstein equilibrium is a lean equilibrium.
Proof. Let a∗ be an Abreu-Rubinstein equilibrium. Clearly, the profile a∗ is a Nash equilibrium. Now
consider a player i ∈ N and an action ai ∈ Ai. We want to show that if ai⊳ a∗i , then (a∗−i, ai) is not a Nash
equilibrium. By the definition of Abreu-Rubinstein equilibrium, if ai ⊳ a∗i , then (a∗−i, ai) ≺i (a∗−i, a∗i ),
implying, as desired, that (a∗−i, ai) is not a Nash equilibrium. 
In light of this proposition, all examples of Abreu-Rubinstein equilibria are examples of lean equilibria.
For instance, the Abreu-Rubinstein equilibria of certain two-player games are studied in [1, Section 5]; all
examples given there are examples of lean equilibria. On the other hand, later in this paper, we will encounter
examples of lean equilibria that are not Abreu-Rubinstein equilibria (for instance, in Examples 5.5 and 5.9).
4 Machine games
In this section, we introduce the machine games whose lean equilibria we will study, and some associated
notions. These games involve choosing machines which implement strategies for repeated games, and have
been previously studied, as discussed in the introduction. For more background on strategies as machines
and for some simple examples, we refer the reader to Osborne and Rubinstein [22, Section 8.4 and Chapter
9].
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Machines and machine games. Let G = (S1, S2, u1, u2) be a two-person game in strategic form, where
Si is a finite set of actions for player i, and ui : S1 × S2 → R is the payoff function for player i.
A machine for player i is a four tuple Mi = (Qi, q1i , λi, δi) where Qi is a finite set of states, q1i ∈ Qi is
the start state or initial state, λi : Qi → Si is the output function, and δi : Qi × Sj → Qi is the transition
function; here, Sj denotes the action set of the other player. We emphasize that in this paper, we consider
only machines that conform to this definition, namely, machines which have a finite number of states and
which are deterministic. We use Mi to denote the set of all machines for player i, relative to a game G. We
often use i and j to denote the two different players.
A pair of machines (M1,M2) naturally induces a sequence (qt)t≥1 of state pairs and a sequence (st)t≥1
of action pairs (G-outcomes), defined inductively as follows:
q1 = (q11 , q
1
2)
st = (λ1(q
t
1), λ2(q
t
2)) for t ≥ 1
qt = (δ1(q
t−1
1 , s
t−1
2 ), δ2(q
t−1
2 , s
t−1
1 )) for t > 1
Each of the sequences (qt), (st) is ultimately periodic; we say that a sequence (bt)t≥1 is ultimately periodic
if there exist numbers n, p ≥ 1 such that for all m ≥ n, it holds that bm = bm+p.
The payoff given to each machine is computed by the limit of means. For a sequence of action pairs (st),
we define rTi (st) to be the average payoff to player i over the first T elements of the sequence, that is, we de-
fine rTi (st) = 1T
∑T
k=1 ui(s
k). We define ri(st) to be the corresponding limit of the average payoffs, that is,
ri(s
t) = limT→∞ r
T
i (s
t); note that we will make use of this function only on ultimately periodic sequences
(st), and so the limit will always exist. For a pair of machines (M1,M2), we define rTi (M1,M2) = rTi (st)
and ri(M1,M2) = ri(st), where here (st) denotes the sequence of action pairs induced by the machines
(M1,M2). Our focus will be on the machine game defined by Gm = (M1,M2, r1, r2).
Paths and cycles. With respect to a two-player game, a path in a machine Mi is a sequence p1
a1→ p2
a2→
· · ·
am→ pm+1 where p1, . . . , pm+1 ∈ Qi are states, a1, . . . , am ∈ Sj are actions, and δi(pk, ak) = pk+1 for
each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. A cycle is a path where p1 = pm+1, and is said to be a simple cycle if the states
p1, . . . , pm are pairwise distinct. For a path P in M1, the payoff to M1, denoted by r1(P ), is defined as
1
m
∑m
k=1 u1(λ1(pk), ak); and, the payoff to M2, denoted by r2(P ), is defined as 1m
∑m
k=1 u2(λ1(pk), ak).
For a path P in M2, the payoffs r1(P ) and r2(P ) are defined similarly. It is known and straightforward to
verify that, in the machine game Gm, a payoff-maximizing response for player i to a machine Mj has payoff
equal to the maximum of ri(C) over all cycles in the machine Mj reachable from the initial state, which is
equal to the maximum of ri(C) over all such cycles in the machine Mj that are simple.
Let us define a subcycle of a cycle p1
a1→ p2
a2→ · · ·
am→ pm+1 to be a cycle that has either the form
pn
an→ pn+1
an+1
→ · · · pn′ or the form pn′
an′→ pn′+1
an′+1
→ · · ·
am→ pm+1 = p1
a1→ p2
a2→ · · · pn with n, n′
satisfying 1 ≤ n ≤ n′ ≤ m.
Complexity measures. We will study three complexity measures on machines. The first is the number of
states |Qi| of a machine Mi. We define the other two in the following way. We define a threat state of a
machine Mi to be a state q such that δi(q, s) = q for all s ∈ Sj and where maxaj∈Aj uj(λi(q), aj) is the
minmax payoff of the other player j, that is, where λi(q) forces the other player j to his minmax payoff. We
define a normal state of a machine Mi to be a state that is not a threat state. We use Ri to denote the set of
all normal states of a machine Mi, and we use ||δi|| to denote the number of normal transitions, by which
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we mean transitions between normal states:
||δi|| = |{(qi, sj) ∈ Ri × Sj | δi(qi, sj) ∈ Ri}|.
The two other complexity measures that we will study are the number of normal states, denoted by |R|,
and the number of normal transitions, denoted by ||δ||. We will speak of lean equilibria with respect to,
for instance, the measure |R|, by which we mean a lean equilibria where the complexity order for player i
is given by Mi Ei M ′i if and only if |Ri| ≤ |R′i|; here, Ri and R′i denote the sets of normal states of the
machines Mi and M ′i , respectively.
Relative to a pair of machines (M1,M2), for each i ∈ {1, 2}, we define the set of played states for
player i, denoted by Pi, to be the set {qti | t ≥ 1}; here, (qt) denotes the sequence of state pairs induced by
(M1,M2). We identify the following facts concerning played states, which we will sometimes use tacitly in
the sequel.
Proposition 4.1 Let (M1,M2) be a pair of machines having a strictly enforceable payoff profile. For each
player i ∈ {1, 2}:
• Every played state is a normal state, and thus it holds that |Pi| ≤ |Ri|.
• The number of played states lower bounds the number of normal transitions: |Pi| ≤ ||δi||.
The first claim follows from the assumption that the payoff profile is strictly enforceable, which implies that
neither player ever plays a threat state. The second claim follows from the first and the observation that
every played state has at least one transition to another played state.
Equivalence relations. We now introduce a number of equivalence relations, each of which is defined
over the set of positive integers, that will be used in our analysis and description of lean equilibria. Let
(st) and (qt) be the sequences of action pairs and state pairs, respectively, induced by a pair of machines.
We define the equivalence relation ≡s by: t ≡s t′ if and only if for all n ≥ 0, it holds that st+n = st
′+n
.
Similarly, we define the equivalence relation ≡q by: t ≡q t′ if and only if for all n ≥ 0, it holds that
qt+n = qt
′+n
. However, from the determinism of the machines, it is straightforward to verify that t ≡q t′
if and only if qt = qt′ ; we will make use of this simpler characterization. As the sequence (st) is equal
to the sequence (qt) mapped under the functions (λ1, λ2), it is clear that if t ≡q t′, then t ≡s t′; viewing
these equivalence relations as sets of pairs, we can write ≡q⊆≡s. We define the equivalence relations ≡i
for i ∈ {1, 2} by t ≡i t′ if and only if qti = qt
′
i . It is clear that t ≡q t′ if and only if t ≡1 t′ and t ≡2 t′. For a
value t ≥ 1, we will use [t]s to denote the ≡s-equivalence class of t, and similarly for the other equivalence
relations.
5 Establishing lean equilibrium: examples and theory
In this section, we give techniques for establishing that outcomes of the machine game are at lean equi-
librium, and illustrate their use by presenting a number of examples. We begin by defining some notions;
the definitions and also the later results are relative to a game G = (S1, S2, u1, u2) and its corresponding
machine game Gm, although in what follows we will generally not mention the games G and Gm explicitly.
By a finite action sequence, we mean a finite-length sequence σ = σ1 . . . σk of action pairs (elements
of S1 × S2). For each player i ∈ {1, 2}, we define the payoff of a finite action sequence σ as ri(σ) =
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(ui(σ
1) + · · · + ui(σ
k))/k. We say that a finite action sequence σ is strictly enforceable if its payoff
profile (r1(σ), r2(σ)) is strictly enforceable. Each strictly enforceable finite action sequence σ naturally
induces a pair of machines (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ), where for each player i ∈ {1, 2}, the machine Mσi is defined to
have k + 1 states: k normal states, which we denote as {1, . . . , k}, and a threat state. The output function
λi is defined with λi(n) = σni for all n ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The transition function δi has δi(n, σnj ) = n + 1
for n ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, and δi(k, σkj ) = 1; all other transitions out of the normal states go to the threat
state. We use 〈σ〉 to denote the infinite sequence obtained by repeating σ, that is, the sequence σσ . . . =
σ1 . . . σkσ1 . . . σk . . .. The sequence of action pairs generated by (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) is clearly equal to 〈σ〉. This
property is a motivation for the definition of the machines: the transitions of the machines are designed so
that the machines together will generate the sequence 〈σ〉, but each machine will “punish” any deviation
from this sequence by moving to and settling upon its threat state. We call a machine M a σ-machine
if for any best response M ′ to M , the pair (M,M ′) generates the sequence 〈σ〉; clearly, for any strictly
enforceable sequence σ, the machines Mσ1 and Mσ2 are σ-machines.
We now present the first concepts and results that will allow us to give examples of lean equilibria.
Relative to a sequence (st) of action pairs we say that two time points t1, t2 ≥ 1 are i-incompatible if there
exists m ≥ 0 such that (1) for all n with 0 ≤ n < m, it holds that st1+nj = st2+nj , and (2) st1+mi 6= st2+mi .
We say that two equivalence classes T1, T2 of ≡s are i-incompatible if there exist t1 ∈ T1 and t2 ∈ T2 such
that t1 and t2 are i-incompatible; observe that, in fact, if equivalence classes T1 and T2 are i-incompatible,
then for all t1 ∈ T1, t2 ∈ T2 it holds that t1 and t2 are i-incompatible.
Proposition 5.1 Let (qt), (st) be the state sequence and action sequence induced by a pair of machines. If
two ≡s-equivalence classes T1, T2 are i-incompatible, then for all t1 ∈ T1, t2 ∈ T2, it holds that qt1i 6= qt2i .
This proposition follows immediately from the definitions of (qt) and (st).
We say that a finite action sequence σ is i-irreducible if for any two distinct values t1, t2 ∈ {1, . . . , k},
it holds that [t1]s and [t2]s are i-incompatible with respect to (st) = 〈σ〉.
Theorem 5.2 Let σ be a strictly enforceable finite action sequence of length k, and let Mj be a σ-machine.
If σ is i-irreducible, then then there are k ≡s-equivalence classes, [1]s, . . . , [k]s; and, for any best response
Ni to Mj with |Pi| ≤ k, the pair (Ni,Mj) has ≡i equal to ≡s.
Proof. By the definition of i-irreducibility and the definition of≡s, we have that there are k ≡s-equivalence
classes, [1]s, . . . , [k]s. Consider a best response Ni to Mj . Since Mj is a σ-machine, the pair (Ni,Mj)
must produce an action sequence (st) equal to 〈σ〉. By Proposition 5.1, no i-state is played in two different
≡s-equivalence classes. Since by hypothesis the number of states played by i is less than or equal to k, we
have that [1]s, . . . , [k]s must be the equivalence classes of ≡i, and hence that ≡i is equal to ≡s. 
In this section, we will give a number of examples involving the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which we take to
be the following game:
C D
C (2, 2) (-1, 3)
D (3, -1) (0, 0)
Note that, in this game, each of the two players has a minmax payoff of 0. For an integer N ≥ 0 and an action
pair (s1, s2), we will use the notation N · (s1, s2) to denote the finite action sequence containing N copies
of the pair (s1, s2). For instance, 2 ·(C,D) represents the sequence (C,D), (C,D) and 2 ·(D,C), 3 ·(C,D)
represents the sequence (D,C), (D,C), (C,D), (C,D), (C,D).
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Example 5.3 Let NC , ND ≥ 1 be constants, and consider the finite action sequence σ = NC · (C,C), ND ·
(D,D) in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Clearly, the sequence σ is strictly enforceable, and has length k =
NC + ND. We show that, with respect to the measures |R| and ||δ||, the pair (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) is an Abreu-
Rubinstein equilibrium, and hence a lean equilibrium (by Proposition 3.4), as follows.
First, we show that the sequence σ is both 1-irreducible and 2-irreducible. We begin by arguing 1-
irreducibility. Let t1, t2 ∈ {1, . . . , k} be two distinct values, and assume without loss of generality that
t1 < t2. We show that t1 and t2 are 1-incompatible with respect to 〈σ〉. If σt11 6= σ
t2
1 , then clearly t1 and
t2 are 1-incompatible. In the case that σt11 = σ
t2
1 , by the definition of σ, there exists a minimum value
m ≥ 1 such that σt21 6= 〈σ〉
t2+m
1 ; observe that σ
t1
1 = 〈σ〉
t1+m
1 . For all n with 0 ≤ n < m, we have
〈σ〉t1+n2 = 〈σ〉
t2+n
2 = σ
t2
1 , and so we have that t1 and t2 are 1-incompatible. We thus have that σ is 1-
irreducible; by an argument that is identical up to swapping the players, we also have that σ is 2-irreducible.
We now argue that the pair (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) is an Abreu-Rubinstein equilibrium with respect to |R| and ||δ||.
Observe that for these machines, we have |R1| = |R2| = ||δ1|| = ||δ2|| = k. We show by contradiction that
there is no player 1 best response N1 to Mσ2 having |R1| < k or ||δ1|| < k. Suppose that there is; then the
payoff profile of (N1,Mσ2 ) must be (r1(σ), r2(σ)), which is strictly enforceable, and by Proposition 4.1,
it holds that |P1| < k. By the 1-irreducibility of σ and Theorem 5.2, it holds that ≡1 is equal to ≡s and
hence that |P1| = k, contradicting that |P1| < k. It can similarly be shown that there is no player 2 best
response N2 to Mσ1 having |R2| < k or ||δ2|| < k. We have thus argued that the pair (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) is an
Abreu-Rubinstein equilibrium with respect to |R| and ||δ||.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it can similarly be shown that for constants NCD, NDC ≥ 1, the finite action
sequence σ = NCD ·(C,D), NDC ·(D,C) is both 1-irreducible and 2-irreducible, and that when σ is strictly
enforceable, the pair (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) is an Abreu-Rubinstein equilibrium with respect to both |R| and ||δ||. More
generally, let G = (S1, S2, u1, u2) be a game, let β1 : {1, . . . , b} → S1 and β2 : {1, . . . , b} → S2 be
injective mappings, and let N1, . . . , Nb ≥ 1 be constants, with b ≥ 2. By arguments similar to those given
above, the finite action sequence σ = N1 · (β1(1), β2(1)), . . . , Nb · (β1(b), β2(b)) can be shown to be both
1-irreducible and 2-irreducible, and when σ is strictly enforceable, the pair (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) can be shown to be
an Abreu-Rubinstein equilibrium with respect to |R| and ||δ||. 
We now introduce another technique for establishing lean equilibria. Let σ be a finite action sequence.
Define a rotation of σ = σ1 . . . σk to be a length k sequence of the form σnσn+1 . . . σkσ1σ2 . . . σn−1 for n
with 1 ≤ n ≤ k. Let i ∈ {1, 2} be one of the players and letB ⊆ Si. We say that σ is (i, B)-rigid if for every
rotation ρ of σ and every n with 1 ≤ n < k, when ρ1i , ρ
n+1
i ∈ B, it holds that (uj(ρ1)+ · · ·+uj(ρn))/n 6=
rj(σ).
Theorem 5.4 Let i ∈ {1, 2} and B ⊆ Si. Let σ be a strictly enforceable finite action sequence of length k,
let b be the number of elements σn of σ with σni ∈ B, and let Mj be a σ-machine. If σ is (i, B)-rigid, then
for any machine Ni with |{q ∈ Pi | λi(q) ∈ B}| < b relative to (Ni,Mj), the pair (Ni,Mj) is not a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Since Mj is a σ-machine, if (st) is not equal to 〈σ〉, then Ni is not a best response to Mj and
(Ni,Mj) is not a Nash equilibrium, so we assume that (st) = 〈σ〉.
Consider the state pair sequence (q1+dk)d≥1. By the finiteness of the state sets of the machines, some
state pair must occur infinitely often in this sequence. Hence we can find time points t1, t2 of the form 1+dk
with t1 < t2 such that qt1 = qt2 . The sequence qt1 , qt1+1, . . . , qt2 determines a cycle
C = qt1i
s
t1
j
→ qt1+1i
s
t1+1
j
→ · · · qt2i
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in Ni. By our choice of t1, t2 and the assumption that (st) = 〈σ〉, we have rj(C) = rj(Ni,Mσj ) = rj(σ).
By the hypothesis on B and b, among the sequence of states qt1i , q
t1+1
i , . . . , q
t1+(k−1)
i there must be
two indices t′ < t′′ with qt′i = qt
′′
i and λ(qt
′
i ) ∈ B. The sequence of states qt
′
i , q
t′+1
i , . . . , q
t′′
i determine a
subcycle C ′ of C which, by (i, B)-rigidity, has rj(C ′) 6= rj(C). We can view C as the concatenation of the
subcycle C ′ with another subcycle C ′′. The value rj(C) is the convex combination of rj(C ′) and rj(C ′′);
since rj(C ′) 6= rj(C), we have rj(C ′′) 6= rj(C). It must hold that one of the values rj(C ′), rj(C ′′) is
strictly greater than rj(C). This implies that (Ni,Mj) is not a Nash equilibrium, as player j could strictly
improve his payoff by deviating. 
Example 5.5 Consider, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a strictly enforceable payoff w that is the convex com-
bination of u(C,C) and u(C,D). We can write w = (NCC/N)u(C,C) + (NCD/N)u(C,D) where
NCC , NCD are integers, and N = NCC + NCD. Since the payoff w is strictly enforceable, we have
NCC > 0. We can assume that NCC , NCD do not share any prime factors, for if they do share one, we can
divide both of them by the factor while preserving the value of w. Note that this assumption implies that
NCC and N do not share any prime factors.
Let σ = NCC · (C,C), NCD · (C,D). We will show that (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) is a lean equilibrium with respect
to |R| and ||δ||. Note that the first player could preserve payoff but reduce complexity via a machine with
one state that always outputs C , a machine that has |R| = 1 and ||δ|| = 2. Hence this pair is not an Abreu-
Rubinstein equilibrium with respect to |R| when N ≥ 2, nor with respect to ||δ|| when N ≥ 3. Along
these lines, observe that no two ≡s-equivalence classes (for 〈σ〉) are 1-incompatible, since in the sequence
σ player 1 always plays the same action.
We show that σ is (1, {C})-rigid. We show this by contradiction; let ρ be a rotation of σ and let n be
such that 1 ≤ n < N and (u2(ρ1) + · · · + u2(ρn))/n = w. This implies that for integers nCC , nCD with
0 ≤ nCC ≤ n, 0 ≤ nCD ≤ n, and nCC + nCD = n, we have (nCC/n)u(C,C) + (nCD/n)u(C,D) = w.
Since u(C,C) 6= u(C,D), we have nCC/n = NCC/N , implying that NCCn = nCCN . This implies that
N > 1 divides NCCn. Since N and NCC do not share any prime factors, this implies that N divides n, a
contradiction to n < N . We have thus shown that σ is (1, {C})-rigid.
Consider any machine N1 with |R1| < N or ||δ1|| < N . Such a machine must have |P1| < N , and
hence by Theorem 5.4, the pair (N1,Mσ2 ) is not a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, it is straightforward
to verify that the sequence σ is 2-irreducible. Thus, for any machine N2 with |R2| < N or ||δ2|| < N , we
have |P2| < N and by Theorem 5.2, the machine N2 is not a best response to Mσ1 . We conclude that the
pair (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) is a lean equilibrium with respect to |R| and ||δ||. 
Example 5.6 Consider, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a finite action sequence of the form σ = kCD·(C,D), kDD ·
(D,D), kDC(D,C), where kCD, kDD, kDC ≥ 1 and σ is strongly enforceable. We use k to denote the
length kCD + kDD + kDC of σ. We show that the pair (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) is a lean equilibrium with respect to |R|
and ||δ||.
Let N1 be a machine for player 1. Suppose that N1 is a best response to Mσ2 . Then the pair (N1,Mσ2 )
produces the action sequence (st) = 〈σ〉. We show that if N1 has |R1| < k or ||δ1|| < k, then the pair
(N1,M
σ
2 ) is not a Nash equilibrium.
Let QC denote the states of N1 that output C , and let QD denote the normal states of N1 that output
D. It is straightforward to verify that for any two distinct t1, t2 ∈ {1, . . . , kCD}, the classes [t1]s, [t2]s are
1-incompatible, and hence, we have |QC | ≥ kCD by Proposition 5.1. We next show that σ is (1, {D})-rigid.
Consider any rotation ρ of σ and a value n with 1 ≤ n < k and ρ11 = ρn+11 = D; in one of the sequences
ρ′ = ρ1 . . . ρn, ρ
′′ = ρn+1 . . . ρk, player 1 uses only the action D and hence one of the values r2(ρ′), r2(ρ′′)
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is strictly below 0. On the other hand, r2(σ) is strictly above 0 and can be written as the convex combination
of r2(ρ′) and r2(ρ′′), and so neither of r2(ρ′), r2(ρ′′) is equal to r2(σ), and we have that σ is (1, {D})-rigid.
Now suppose that N1 has |R1| < k or ||δ1|| < k. It follows that |P1| < k; since |QC | ≥ kCD, this implies
that |QD| < kDD + kDC . By Theorem 5.4, we have that (N1,Mσ2 ) is not a Nash equilibrium.
In a similar way, it can be shown that for any best response N2 to Mσ1 , if N2 has |R2| < k or ||δ2|| < k,
then the pair (Mσ1 , N2) is not a Nash equilibrium. We thus have that (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) is a lean equilibrium with
respect to |R| and ||δ||. 
So far, our discussion has focused on the complexity measures |R| and ||δ||. We now turn our attention
to the complexity measure |Q|.
Example 5.7 As in the previous example, let σ be a finite action sequence of the form σ = kCD·(C,D), kDD ·
(D,D), kDC(D,C) for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where kCD, kDD, kDC ≥ 1 and σ is strongly enforceable;
let k denote the length kCD + kDD + kDC of σ. We give a pair of machines (M1,M2) where each machine
has k states that is a lean equilibrium with respect to |Q|.
We define the machines M1,M2 as follows. Each machine has state set Q1 = Q2 = {1, . . . , k}, initial
states q11 = q
1
2 = 1, and has output function defined by λi(n) = σni for all n ∈ Qi. For the states n ∈ Qi
where σnj = D, we define δi(n,C) = δi(n,D) = n+ 1, where k + 1 is understood to represent the state 1.
For the states n ∈ Qi where σnj = C , we define δi(n,C) = n + 1 and δi(n,D) = q∗i where q∗i is the first
state where σnj = C , that is, q∗1 = kCD + kDD + 1 and q∗2 = 1. The states q∗i can be thought of as “internal
threat” states. This construction is similar to that of [1, Page 1276, Case B].
We now observe that in each machine Mi, the simple cycle Ci that maximizes payoff to the other player
j is the cycle naturally corresponding to σ, that is, 1
σ1j
→ 2
σ2j
→ · · · k
σkj
→ 1; this cycle has rj(Ci) = rj(σ). This
is clearly the unique payoff-maximizing simple cycle of length k. Also, in all shorter simple cycles, player
i only defects, yielding player j a payoff strictly less than 0.
Let Ni be a best response to Mj . By the observation in the previous paragraph, the sequence (qtj) must,
after some finite amount of time, be equal to the sequence 1, . . . , k repeated infinitely. It is hence possible
to modify the machine Ni, by changing its initial state to a state that is played against the state q1j = 1 in the
mentioned infinite repetition, to obtain a machine N ′i that, along with Mj , generates the sequence 〈σ〉, and
has the same number of states as Ni. Now, if N ′i and Ni have strictly fewer than k states, then against Mj
they have strictly fewer than k played states, and then by arguing as in Example 5.6, the pair (N ′i ,Mj) is not
a Nash equilibrium, from which it follows that the pair (Ni,Mj) is not a Nash equilibrium. We conclude
that (M1,M2) is a lean equilibrium with respect to |Q|. 
We now establish a theorem that will help us to establish lean equilibrium results with respect to |Q|.
Let us say that σ is i-foolable if there exists a rotation ρ = ρ1 . . . ρk of σ and an action s′ ∈ Sj such that for
all n with 1 ≤ n ≤ k, it holds that rj(ρnρn+1 . . . ρk−1ρ′) > rj(σ), where ρ′ is the pair with player i action
equal to ρki and player j action equal to s′.
Theorem 5.8 Let σ be a strictly enforceable finite action sequence, and let Mj be a σ-machine. If σ is
i-foolable (via ρ), and Ni is a machine such that in (Ni,Mj) it holds that Pi = Qi (that is, all states in Ni
are played), then (Ni,Mj) is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If Ni is not a best response to Mj , we are done, so we assume that Ni is a best response to Mj , in
which case we have (st) = 〈σ〉. Let qi be any state of Qi. We claim that there is a path P in Ni from qi to a
state q′i ∈ Qi such that rj(P ) > rj(σ). This suffices, since it implies that Mj is not a best response to Ni.
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We reason as follows. By hypothesis, the state qi is played and hence there exists t ≥ 1 with qi = qti .
Since (st) = 〈σ〉, there exists n with 1 ≤ n ≤ k where ρnρn+1 . . . ρk = stst+1 . . . st+(k−n). The desired
path P starts at qi and has actions ρnj . . . ρ
k−1
j s
′
, where s′ ∈ Sj is the action from the definition of i-foolable;
by that definition, we have rj(P ) > rj(σ). 
Example 5.9 We return to the class of sequences considered in our first example, Example 5.3. Let
NC , ND ≥ 1 be constants, and consider the finite action sequence σ = NC · (C,C), ND · (D,D) in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma; the sequence σ is strictly enforceable, and has length k = NC +ND. We show that
the pair (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) is a lean equilibrium with respect to |Q|. Note that this pair is not an Abreu-Rubinstein
equilibrium with respect to |Q|, since each of the machines has a threat state that is never played, and hence
each of the machines could be simplified without sacrificing payoff by removing this threat state.
To show that the described pair is a lean equilibrium, we show that, for each player i, when Ni is a best
response to Mσj with k or fewer states, the pair (Ni,Mσj ) is not a Nash equilibrium. By the argumentation
in Example 5.3, any such best response Ni must have at least k played states. Hence in such a best response
Ni, all states are played; by Theorem 5.8, it thus suffices to show that the sequence σ is i-foolable. It is
straightforward to verify that σ is i-foolable via the rotation ρ = ND · (D,D), NC · (C,C) and the action
D ∈ Sj . 
Example 5.10 We reconsider the sequences treated in Example 5.5. Let σ = NCC · (C,C), NCD · (C,D),
where NCC > 0 and NCC , NCD do not share any prime factors. We show that the pair (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) is a lean
equilibrium with respect to |Q|. This pair is not an Abreu-Rubinstein equilibrium with respect to |Q|: the
first machine could be simplified to a machine that only outputs C without giving up payoff, and the second
machine could eliminate its threat state without giving up payoff.
We show that the sequence σ is both 1-foolable and 2-foolable. We have 1-foolability by the rotation
(NCC − 1) · (C,C), NCD · (C,D), (C,C) and the action D ∈ S2, and we have 2-foolability by the rotation
NCD · (C,D), NCC · (C,C) and the action D ∈ S1.
We can now argue that the pair (Mσ1 ,Mσ2 ) is a lean equilibrium with respect to |Q|. The structure of the
argument is similar to that of the previous example. Consider a player i and a best response Ni to Mσj with
k or fewer states. It is shown in Example 5.5 that if Ni has strictly fewer than k played states, then (Ni,Mσj )
is not a Nash equilibrium. In the case that Ni has exactly k played states, all of its states are played and then
(Ni,M
σ
j ) is not a Nash equilibrium by Theorem 5.8. 
The results in the last three examples demonstrate different types of payoffs that are sustainable by lean
equilibria with respect to |Q| in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In particular, Example 5.7 shows that
any strictly enforceable payoff profile in the interior of the convex hull of the points u(C,D), u(D,D), and
u(D,C), is a payoff attainable by such a lean equilibrium. These results can be contrasted strongly with
the results of Abreu and Rubinstein [1, Section 5] showing that the payoffs of Abreu-Rubinstein equilibria
in this context are the strictly enforceable payoffs that are convex combinations of the diagonals, that is,
convex combinations of u(C,C) and u(D,D) and convex combinations of u(C,D) and u(D,C).
6 Structure of lean equilibria
In this section, we present results describing the structure of lean equilibria in machine games Gm =
(M1,M2, r1, r2) with respect to the complexity measures |R| and ||δ||. Our first result demonstrates that
the sequence (qt) begins with a sequence of state pairs where each state is used only once, followed by a
state pair where each state is used infinitely often.
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Lemma 6.1 (1-∞ Lemma) Suppose that (M1,M2) is a lean equilibrium of Gm with respect to one of the
complexity measures |R|, ||δ|| having a strictly enforceable payoff profile. Let u ≥ 1 be the minimum value
such that one of the states qu1 , qu2 is used later in the sequence (qt), that is, such that there exists i ∈ {1, 2}
such that qui ∈ {qti | t > u}. Then, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the state qui appears infinitely often in the sequence
(qti).
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose one or both of the states qu1 , qu2 appears finitely often in the
respective sequence (qti). Let Ti(q) denote the set {t | q = qti}, that is, the points in time where player i
plays state q. Observe that T1(qu1 ) ∩ T2(qu2 ) = {u}, for if this intersection contains two distinct elements,
there must be infinitely many points t such that qt = qu.
We claim that the players can be labelled as i′, i′′ in such a way that: (1) Ti′(qui′) is finite, and (2) there
exists v ∈ Ti′′(qui′′) such that v > maxTi′(qui′).
We establish this claim as follows. If both sets T1(qu1 ), T2(qu2 ) are finite, set v = max(T1(qu1 )∪ T2(qu2 ))
and let i′′ be the unique element in {1, 2} such that v ∈ Ti′′(qui′′). If one of the sets T1(qu1 ), T2(qu2 ) is finite
and the other is infinite, let i′ be the player in {1, 2} such that Ti′(qui′) is finite; since Ti′′(qui′′) is infinite, it is
possible to select a value v satisfying condition (2).
For the sake of notation, we now assume that i′ = 1 and i′′ = 2. We want to show that (M1,M2) is not
a lean equilibrium. If (M1,M2) is not a Nash equilibrium, we are done, so we assume that it is. Starting
from M1, we define a new machine M ′1 as follows. We set δ′1(q
u−1
1 , s
u−1
2 ) = q
v
1 , or, in the case that u = 1,
we set the initial state of M ′1 to be qv1 . We then have that
q11
s12→ q21
s22→ · · · qu−11
su−1
2→ qv1
is a path in M ′1. We modify M ′1 so that, other than the transitions in this path, there are no transitions to the
states qv1 , . . . , q
u−1
1 ; we reroute the transitions to these states to a threat state. We also eliminate the state qu1 ,
rerouting the transitions to it to a threat state. The state sequence induced by the machine pair (M ′1,M2)
is q1, q2, . . . , qu−1, qv, qv+1, qv+2, . . . and hence the payoffs to each of the two players is the same as in
(M1,M2).
We show that (M ′1,M2) is a Nash equilibrium by arguing that player 2 cannot obtain a strictly better
payoff. Let C be any cycle in M ′1. None of the states q11, . . . , qu1 can appear in C; since all modified
transitions involved these states, the cycle C is also a cycle of M1. As M2 was a best response to M1, it is a
best response to M ′1.
We now need only argue that M ′1 is simpler than M1. In (M1,M2), the state qu1 is a played state of M1,
so by Proposition 4.1, we have |R′1| < |R1|. Also, the state qu1 contributes at least 1 to the value ||δ1||, a
contribution not present in the calculation of ||δ′1||, so ||δ′1|| < ||δ1||. 
Lemma 6.2 Suppose that (M1,M2) is a lean equilibrium of Gm with respect to one of the complexity
measures |R|, ||δ|| having a strictly enforceable payoff profile, and suppose that ≡i is contained in ≡s (for
some i ∈ {1, 2}). Then, the equivalence relations ≡s, ≡i are equal.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose there are two values t′′ < t′ such that t′′ ≡s t′ but t′′ 6≡i t′.
Without loss of generality, we assume that i = 1, and so we have qt′′1 6= qt
′
1 . We want to show that (M1,M2)
is not a lean equilibrium; if (M1,M2) is not a Nash equilibrium, we are done, so we assume that it is.
Define M ′1 to be the machine equal to M1, but where the state qt
′′
1 is eliminated and all transitions to qt
′′
1
from states in R1 \ {qt
′′
1 } are changed to transitions to qt
′
1 .
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The machine M ′1 is simpler than M1 with respect to the complexity measure |R|, as it has one fewer
played state than M1 (see Proposition 4.1). It is also simpler than M1 with respect to ||δ||: the number of
normal transitions out of states in R′1 is equal to that of R1, but the state qt
′′
1 (in M1) has at least one normal
transition, as it is played in (M1,M2).
We claim that (M ′1,M2) is a Nash equilibrium of Gm, which suffices. Define f([t]s) as {qu1 ∈ Q1 | u ∈
[t]s}. Let (qˆt), (sˆt) be the sequences induced by the machines (M ′1,M2). We prove by induction that for all
t ≥ 1, it holds that qˆt1 ∈ f([t]), qˆt2 = qt2, and sˆt = st. The base case is clear, so assume that the claim holds on
t ≥ 1. Then qˆt1 = qt
′
1 for some t′ ≡s t. As sˆt2 = st2 = st
′
2 , we have qˆt+11 = δ1(qˆt1, sˆt2) = δ1(qt
′
1 , s
t′
2 ) = q
t′+1
1 .
This implies that qˆt+11 ∈ f([t′ + 1]s) = f([t + 1]s). As λ1(qˆt1) = λ1(qt
′
1 ) = λ1(q
t
1) = s
t
1, we have
qˆt+12 = q
t+1
2 and hence sˆt+1 = st+1.
Thus, to show that (M ′1,M2) is a Nash equilibrium of Gm, it suffices to show that M2 cannot deviate to
obtain a strictly higher payoff. Suppose that p1
a1→ p2
a2→ · · · pm
am→ p1 is a M ′1-cycle C giving M2 a payoff
r > r2(M1,M2) = r2(M
′
1,M2). By the choice of the values t′′, t′, there is a path P in M1 from qt
′′
1 to q
t′
1
whose M2-payoff is r2(M1,M2). For each state-action pair (pj, aj) in the cycle C with δ1(pj , aj) = qt
′′
1
(and hence δ′1(pj , aj) = qt
′
1 ), replace pj+1 = qt
′
1 with the path P . In this way, we obtain a M1-cycle
whose payoff is also strictly greater than r2(M1,M2) = r2(M ′1,M2), contradicting that (M1,M2) is a
Nash equilibrium of Gm. 
With respect to a machine pair (M1,M2), we let Pi denote the set of played states of Mi.
Lemma 6.3 Suppose that (M1,M2) has a strictly enforceable payoff profile. If (M1,M2) is a lean equi-
librium with respect to |R|, then |R1| = |R2| = |P1| = |P2|, and if (M1,M2) is a lean equilibrium with
respect to ||δ||, then ||δ1|| = ||δ2|| = |P1| = |P2|.
Proof. We claim that, starting from a Nash equilibrium (M1,M2) with a strictly enforceable payoff profile,
player j has a best response M ′j to Mi where (M ′j ,Mi) is a Nash equilibrium and such that |Rj | ≤ |Pi| and
||δj || ≤ |Pi|. This implies, in the case of a lean equlibrium with respect to |R|, that |R2| ≤ |P1| ≤ |R1| ≤
|P2| ≤ |R2|, and similarly, in the case of a lean equilibrium with respect to ||δ||, that |P2| ≤ ||δ2|| ≤ |P1| ≤
||δ1|| ≤ |P2|. The claim is argued as follows. The payoffs r1(M1,M2), r2(M1,M2) are equal to the payoffs
to the two players of a cycle C in machine Mi. The cycle C is not necessarily a simple cycle, but if it is
not simple, it can be viewed as the concatenation of two shorter cycles. Each of the two shorter cycles must
give the same payoff to player j (otherwise (M1,M2) would not be a Nash equilibrium, as player j could
profitably deviate). We choose the cycle out of the two shorter cycles that gives the higher payoff to player
i. We then iterate this process until we obtain a simple cycle C ′. The simple cycle has rj(C ′) = rj(C) and
ri(C
′) ≥ ri(C). It is possible to implement a player j machine M ′j that repeatedly walks the cycle C ′ in Mi
satisfying the stated inequalities: this is done by taking a machine that simply walks a shortest path from the
initial state of Mi to a state in the cycle C ′, and then repeatedly walks the cycle C ′. The pair (M ′j ,Mi) is a
Nash equilibrium: the machine M ′j obtains the same payoff as the machine M ′j , and the machine Mi could
only profitably deviate by playing a threat state; but since his payoff is greater than or equal to his payoff in
(Mj ,Mi), this is not beneficial as his payoff is strictly above his minmax payoff. 
We now present our main structure theorem. This theorem not only describes the structure of machines
at lean equilibrium with respect to the measure ||δ||, but shows that their structure can be derived solely
from the equivalence relation ≡s, and hence just from the action sequence (st); this implies that a third-
party observer that only views the resulting action sequence can infer the structure of the machines. In order
to give the statement, we introduce the following notion. Define a rho-machine to be a machine M where
each normal state q reachable from the initial state has exactly one outgoing transition to a normal state;
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denote this successor state by s(q). We call the set of states occurring finitely often in the sequence q1,
s(q1), s2(q1), . . . the tail of the machine, and the other states (those occurring infinitely often) the head of
the machine.
Theorem 6.4 Suppose that (M1,M2) is a lean equilibrium of Gm with respect to the complexity mea-
sure ||δ|| having a strictly enforceable payoff profile. Then, the equivalence relations ≡s, ≡q, ≡1, ≡2 are
all equal, and for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the machine Mi is a rho-machine having exactly one state qi([t]s)
that is played at all time points [t]s for each equivalence class [t]s of ≡s, whose structure is given by
δi(qi([t]s), s
t
j) = qi([t+ 1]s) for all t ≥ 1.
Proof. By Lemma 6.3, in each of the machines M1, M2, each played state has exactly one outgoing normal
transition which is to another played state. Thus, each of the machines is a rho-machine. By Lemma 6.1,
the machines have the same tail size and the same head size, and thus the equivalence relations ≡1 and ≡2
are the same, from which it follows (by definition of ≡q) that the equivalence relations ≡1, ≡2, and ≡q are
all the same. Since ≡q is always contained in ≡s, we can invoke Lemma 6.2 to obtain that ≡1 and ≡2 are
each equal to ≡s, and we have that all four of the equivalence relations are equal.
For each i ∈ {1, 2}, by the equivalence of ≡i and ≡s, the machine Mi has one played state for each
equivalence class of ≡s. As already noted, each played state has exactly one outgoing normal transition
which is to another played state, and so the machine must be a rho-machine with the described structure. 
7 Discussion
We introduced and studied the notion of lean equilibrium, a particular form of Nash equilibrium where
strategies cannot be further simplified according to a cautious simplification procedure: a player simplifies
only if post-simplification, the strategy vector will be a Nash equilibrium. It is possible to consider similar
equilibrium notions relative to even more cautious simplification procedures: for instance, a player might
anticipate simplifications of other players, and only want to simplify if, in addition to preserving Nash
equilibrium, he will not lose payoff if other players simplify following his simplification. A variant of
this idea would have a player simplifying if he will not lose payoff in the case that other players change
best response following his simplification. We leave the investigation of these equilibrium notions to future
work. The broad research direction that we hope to have identified in the present work is that of investigating
notions of equilibria where players prefer simple strategies, but where the desire for simplicity is not wired
directly into the players’ payoffs.
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